This article analyses the domestication of human rights treaties in Nigeria. It points out the shortcomings of the present dualist model under the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and makes suggestions for reform. It also examines the effect of beliefs and cultural values on the effective application of human rights treaties in Nigeria.
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria, as a nation state in the international community, has been active in signing and ratifying human rights treaties. 1 Undoubtedly the influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and treaties dealing with traditional civil and political rights have permeated various Nigerian constitutions which, since independence, have always included a chapter devoted to guaranteeing fundamental human rights within Nigeria's borders. 2 However, frequent intervention of the military in Nigerian politics and their style and practice of immediately suspending the fundamental constitutional human rights provisions (as well as declaring military decrees to be superior to the constitution), 3 has brought to the fore to the president for his assent, nor shall it be enacted, unless it is ratified by a majority of all the legislative houses of the states in the federation. 9 In view of Nigeria's chequered political history, replete with several military interventions, it has had several constitutions which adopted the same dualist approach as section 12 of the present constitution. 10 The requirement that a treaty must be enacted as a municipal law before it can be enforced in Nigeria appears to be merely a historical incidence and a colonial relic. As a result of the years of being under the colonial domination of Britain, Nigeria, on independence, automatically adopted the British practice requiring a treaty to be transformed into law before it could apply locally. In the Supreme Court of Nigeria case of Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airlines, Wali JSC explained, ''Nigeria, like any other Commonwealth country, inherited the English common law rules governing the municipal application of international law. '' 11 Section 12 and the Supreme Court of Nigeria
The Supreme Court of Nigeria examined section 12(1) in relation to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter) in the case of Abacha v Fawehinmi (the Abacha case). 12 One of the crucial issues that arose in this case was the status of a domesticated treaty under section 12 vis-à-vis other municipal laws. The applicant filed an application in court against the respondents for, among other things, unlawful arrest and detention contrary to the provisions of the 1979 constitution (which at the time of his arrest was the existing constitution) and also the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act (the African Charter Act). 13 The African Charter Act domesticated the African Charter. The respondents filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case. They argued that the court's jurisdiction was ousted by various decrees of the Nigeria, 1990. then federal military government. 14 In the course of the arguments on the preliminary objection, one crucial argument raised by the applicant was that the provisions of the relevant decrees were inferior to the provisions of the African Charter and therefore could not override the African Charter under which he was seeking relief. The trial judge, after hearing arguments on the preliminary objection, held that the jurisdiction of the court was ousted and struck out the suit. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held, amongst other things, that the African Charter, having been enacted into Nigerian law, assumed a superior position to all other municipal laws. Mustapher JCA of the Court of Appeal, reading the lead judgment, stated as follows: ' This decision of the Court of Appeal was followed in several other Court of Appeal cases dealing with the African Charter. 16 These Court of Appeal decisions appear to have been motivated by the well intentioned desire, not only to protect citizens from human rights abuses by the then military government, but also to ensure that Nigeria honours its international obligations in the human rights treaties it has ratified. The respondents, not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Abacha case, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, like the trial court and the Court of Appeal, had to examine section 12(1) of the 1979 constitution, which is identical to section 12(1) of the 1999 constitution. As a result of the constitutional issue involved in this case, the Supreme Court was constituted by seven justices. 17 The court was unanimous in confirming the dualist effect of section 12(1) of the constitution. 18 The exclusion from domestic application of human rights treaties to which Nigeria has become a party by succession, 19 accession or ratification 20 by the deliberate (or perhaps inadvertent) failure by the legislature to enact them into law appears to be unwarranted. The inequity of section 12(1) is highlighted by the rather blunt and disturbing statement of one of 16 the Supreme Court justices in the Abacha case when he said, ''It is therefore manifest that no matter how beneficial to the country or the citizenry an international treaty to which Nigeria has become a signatory may be it remains unenforceable, if it is not enacted into law of the country by the National Assembly. '' 21 What this indicates is that human rights treaties to which Nigeria is a party, which are actually meant for the ultimate benefit of the citizenry, have no effect except at the instance of the legislature. This, in the view of the author, appears to detract from the crucial objective of entering into such treaties, which are meant to protect individuals from the excesses of the government and its agencies. 22 Apart from endorsing that, under section 12(1) of the constitution, no treaty (including those dealing with human rights) could have force of law in Nigeria unless brought into domestic legislation by the National Assembly, the Supreme Court in the Abacha case also examined the status of such domesticated treaty legislation vis-à-vis other municipal legislation.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPLEMENTED TREATIES AND OTHER NIGERIAN LAWS Domesticated human rights treaty legislation and the constitution
Again, the justices of the Supreme Court in the Abacha case were unanimous in holding that domesticated human rights treaty legislation was in no any way superior to the constitution. 23 The need for the Supreme Court to clarify the status of the African Charter Act vis-à-vis the constitution became necessary in view of certain statements by the Court of Appeal in this case and subsequent cases, which implied that the legislation domesticating the African Charter was superior to the constitution. 24 These Court of Appeal cases, though laudable attempts by the court to curb human rights abuses during the then military regime, created the problem of the status of the African Charter Act vis-à-vis the 1999 constitution under the present democratic civilian regime. It is not surprising that the Supreme Court rejected the view that the African Charter Act was superior to the constitution, since to do otherwise would have been a judicial absurdity in view of the clear provisions of the constitution which declares it to be the supreme law of the land. 25 21 The issue of the status of the constitution vis-à-vis domesticated human rights legislation is not merely an academic debate as there exists a real possibility of a conflict between the constitutional provisions and certain sections of the African Charter Act, which domesticates the African Charter. The fundamental human rights provisions of the constitution are limited to civil and political rights, while the African Charter Act goes beyond this to include socio-economic, cultural and solidarity rights. While it may be said that the African Charter generally supplements and does not necessarily derogate from the constitution, there are certain rights under the African Charter which are enforceable but are expressly identified by the constitution as unenforceable. For instance, article 17(1) of the African Charter says, ''Every individual shall have the right to education''. This right is not contained in the fundamental human rights provision of the constitution. 26 However, section 18 of chapter II of the constitution, headed ''Fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy'' 27 urges the government to direct its policy towards providing equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels, as well as to strive to eradicate illiteracy and to provide as and when practicable free, compulsory and universal primary education, secondary education, adult education and adult literacy programmes. The constitution, however, makes it clear that the fundamental objectives and directive principles under chapter II are not enforceable in court. 28 Consequently, a possible conflict arises whereby the right to education is an enforceable right under the African Charter but contd binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.'' However when there was military intervention in Nigeria, these provisions were always repealed by the military junta which gave a superior status to its legislation (decrees) over the constitution. 26 Chapter IV of the 1999 constitution incorporates the traditional civil and political rights such as: right to life (sec 33); right to human dignity (sec 34); right to personal liberty (sec 35); right to fair hearing (sec 36); right to private and family life (sec 37); right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (sec 38); right to freedom of expression and the press (sec 39); right to peaceful assembly and association (sec 40); right to freedom of movement (sec 41); right to freedom from discrimination (sec 42); right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria (sec 43 Acts of the National Assembly
In the Abacha case, the Supreme Court justices divided on the issue of the status of domesticated treaty legislation (including human rights treaties) vis-à-vis subsequent ''ordinary'' legislation 31 of the National Assembly. The justices were divided between the liberal constructionists (the majority) 32 and the strict constructionists (the minority). 33 The liberal constructionists, led by Ogundare JSC, while not ready to go as far as the Court of Appeal in holding categorically that domesticated treaties (in this case the African Charter Act) 34 were superior to other legislation of the National Assembly, were prepared to apply certain rules of construction to arrive at the same conclusion in this particular case. 35 So far as the liberal constructionists were concerned, since the legislature would be presumed not to intend to breach Nigeria's international obligations, the courts should interprete a conflict between a domesticated treaty and subsequent municipal law in such a way that the former would prevail, unless specifically repealed by the latter. However, they were careful to emphasize that this view should not be taken to give the domesticated treaty law any superior status over the constitution, the paramount municipal law. Neither should it be taken to debar the legislature from subsequently enacting municipal legislation that would expressly repeal the domesticated treaty law. In the words of the The majority liberal constructionist justices were also quick to emphasize that such domesticated treaty legislation could not be used to determine the validity of a subsequent act of the National Assembly. One of the justices pointed out as follows: ''The application of this principle [principle of interpretation that there is a rebuttable presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate rules of international law] does not imply that a statute will be declared ultra vires as being in contravention of a treaty or of an international law, or that the treaty is superior to the national laws (a completely erroneous concept), but that the courts would desist from a construction that would lead to a breach of an accepted rule of international law''. 37 The purport of this liberal constructionist view is that, although there is a presumption in favour of domesticated treaty law in the event of conflict with other municipal laws, such presumption may be rebutted if it is explicitly repealed, modified or varied by a subsequent municipal law. From this decision, there is, therefore, nothing ''sacred'' about a domesticated human rights treaty law since it can be repealed, modified or varied by the legislature. The only onus the liberal constructionist view appears to put upon the legislature is that it can only repeal, modify or vary a domesticated human rights treaty law explicitly rather than implicitly. This clearly differs from the position of the Court of Appeal which put domesticated human rights laws on a higher pedestal than other municipal laws. 38 The strict constructionists, on the other hand, took the position that the domesticated treaty legislation had no special status and was on a par with any other act of the National Assembly. Neither were they inclined to presume that the legislature does not intend to breach international obligations, by holding that domesticated treaty legislation still applies if it is not expressly repealed, amended or varied by a subsequent act. Achike laws. The general rule is that a treaty, which has been incorporated into the body of the municipal laws, ranks at par with the municipal laws. It is rather startling that a law passed to give effect to a treaty should stand on a 'higher pedestal' above all other municipal laws, without more, in the absence of any express provision in the law that incorporated the treaty into municipal law. '' 39 Although technically section 12(1) does not in any way distinguish between treaty legislation and other municipal laws, it does appear that the strict constructionist view is unnecessarily rigid and legalistic, since the courts, in the exercise of their duty to do justice and protect rights, should utilize methods within the framework of the law, including using rules of interpretation, to support the preservation rather than the proscription of rights under domesticated human rights treaties. 40 In the author's opinion, the majority (the liberal constructionists) and minority (the strict constructionists) decisions of the Supreme Court reveal the deficiency of section 12(1) of the constitution, especially as regards domesticated human rights treaty legislation. The government may ratify human rights treaties for the benefit of its citizens, enact them as law and then subsequently repeal, modify or amend the laws to deprive its citizens of the benefits of the treaties! The dualist nature of section 12(1) permits this. 41 the same legislature, which gives authority for the domestic application of a ratified treaty by enacting it as law, must, by logical deduction, have the authority to repeal, modify or amend such laws. 42 The inherent shortcoming of the dualist nature of section 12(1) in guaranteeing the individuals' right to enjoy the protection of rights under human rights treaties ratified by Nigeria, suggests, in the author's view, a need to adjust this provision. 43 
Laws of the States Houses of Assembly
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court's decision in the Abacha case only related to a conflict between treaty legislation and legislation enacted by the National Assembly. In Nigeria's federal system, 44 where the states have powers to legislate on certain matters, 45 the possibility of conflict between domesticated human rights treaties, such as the African Charter Act, and state laws is certainly not a remote possibility. An example of this real and present possibility emerges with the introduction of Islamic criminal law by certain states in the north of Nigeria. 46 The Houses of Assembly of these states enacted, some argue in a manner contrary to the 1999 constitution, 47 penal code laws introducing, 48 amongst other things, certain penalties for offences against Sharia law such as amputation of arms, 49 whipping, 50 stoning to death 51 and crucifixion. 52 These penalties could be said to conflict with article 5 of the African Charter, domesticated as the African Charter Act, which says, ''Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.'' 53 (Emphasis added) Under the 1999 constitution, where there is a conflict between any law validly made by the National Assembly and that enacted by the House of Assembly of a state, the former prevails and the latter (to the extent of its inconsistency) is void. 54 Therefore, since the African Charter Act is by virtue of section 12(1) deemed to be a law validly made by the National Assembly, the Sharia laws of the states should be, at least to the extent of their inconsistency with the charter provisions, void.
SPECIFIC NIGERIAN LEGISLATION DOMESTICATING HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN NIGERIA
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act (the African Charter Act) 55 The African Charter Act legislation merely contains two sections and a schedule which sets out the provisions of the African Charter. The first section provides that, as from the act's commencement on 17 March 1983, the African Charter provisions have force of law in Nigeria and should be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers in Nigeria. The second section gives the formal title of the Act.
The African Charter contained in the schedule to this legislation, consisting of 68 articles, appears to deal with the three generations of human rights: civil and political rights; 56 economic, social and cultural rights, 57 and solidarity rights. 58 However, as a result of the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, the demarcation between these three generations in the African Charter is sometimes not clear-cut and appears to overlap. 59 The charter also imposes certain duties upon the state, as well as the individual. 60 Article 1 imposes an obligation on all states parties to ''recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and … undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.'' 61 The legislation of the National Assembly therefore complies with its obligation under article 1. The Supreme Court justices in the Abacha case were unanimous about the enforceability of the African Charter by the Nigerian courts. 62 One critical issue however relates to the implementation of certain provisions of the charter. While it is easy to implement the traditional civil 56 Arts 2-14: protection from discrimination; equality; right to life; freedom from exploitation and degradation particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment; right to liberty and security of person; right to fair hearing; freedom of conscience and religion; right to receive information and freedom of expression; freedom of association and assembly; freedom of movement; right to participate in government; and right to property. 57 Arts 15-17: right to work; right to health; and right to education. 58 Arts 19-24 dealing with the rights of peoples: equality of all peoples; right to selfdetermination; right of peoples to dispose freely of their wealth and natural resources; right of peoples to development; right of peoples to national and international peace and security; and right of peoples to a clean and healthy environment. socio-economic right to have access to adequate housing. 68 This case held that the government had a positive obligation to take reasonable steps within its available resources to implement this right. 69 In determining whether the state is carrying out its obligation the court pointed out:
''Mere legislation is not enough. The state is obliged to act to achieve the intended result, and the legislative measures will invariably have to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes implemented by the executive. These policies and programmes must be reasonable both in their conception and their implementation. The formulation of a programme is only the first stage in meeting the state's obligations. The programme must also be reasonably implemented. An otherwise reasonable programme that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with the state's obligations' '. 70 In the same light, the resolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa adopting the Declaration of the Pretoria Seminar on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, requires states parties to adopt legislative and other measures, either individually or through international cooperation and assistance, that would ''give full effect to the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the African Charter, by using the maximum of their resources''. 71 Further, it states that states parties have ''an obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the minimum essential levels of each of the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the African Charter''. 72 It then goes on to list certain factors which hinder the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights, such as the lack of good governance and planning, the failure to allocate sufficient resources to implement these rights, the lack of political will, corruption, and the misuse and misdirection of financial resources. It calls for African states to take effective steps to remedy these shortcomings. 73 Though the Grootboom case and the resolution of the African Commission mentioned above would appear apposite in determining whether or not the Nigerian government has breached its obligation to implement socioeconomic rights, there are still difficulties in determining whether such rights are being adequately implemented. For instance, when are policies appropriate and well directed? When are policies reasonably implemented? When is there maximum use of resources in implementing these rights? When would a state party be regarded to have met its obligation of satisfying the minimum essential levels of these rights? Although this might seem obvious in the case of a clearly corrupt, inept and visionless leadership, it might be difficult in other instances when an executive with scarce resources has to make policy decisions on where and how to allocate those resources. Further, it raises difficulties of who determines whether policies are appropriate, well directed and reasonably implemented. Also, who determines whether there is maximum utilization of resources, at least to meet the minimum essential level of implementation of these rights? Is it the courts, the executive arm of government or the citizens?
In its State Party Report submitted in 1996 to the Committee on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Nigerian government had this to say on the implementation of the rights under the covenant: ''On the whole, Nigeria has been implementing these rights despite the current severe economic turbulence being experienced. The economic situation of the vast majority of the population has deteriorated considerably and inflation has increased immensely; so the implementation of these rights are (sic) subjected to the economic situation of the country''. 74 The economy of Nigeria has not improved significantly since then. It would not appear that Nigerians in general would wholeheartedly agree with the above statement in view of the structural adjustment programme, privatization and various market reform programmes, which have caused the Government to divest and hand over interests in various essential services to the private sector, thereby causing the prices of those services to skyrocket out of the reach of a large majority of those who are impoverished. 75 In cases where the government still retains a direct interest in such services, scarcity of funding has resulted in inadequate services for consumers. For example, the annual per capita public spending on health is said to be less than US $5, and as low as US $2 in some parts of Nigeria, which is far below the US $34 recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) for low income countries. 76 As a result, public hospitals are under-funded, understaffed and lack adequate drugs and facilities. Consequently, the citizens are forced to have recourse to the private sector or, if lacking the wherewithal, to suffer in silence.
The Grootboom case appears to suggest that the courts are to determine whether the policies of the executive directed towards ensuring that the people enjoy their socio-economic rights are reasonable. It pointed out that, in doing so, the courts should look out for, amongst other things: whether the allocation of responsibilities and functions by the executive has been coherently and comprehensively addressed; that the programme is not haphazard but rather represents a systematic response to a pressing social need; and that the programme is sufficiently flexible to respond to those in desperate need in society and to meet their immediate and shortterm requirements. 77 So far, there has not been, to the author's knowledge, any decision of the Nigerian courts on the obligation of the Nigerian government with respect to socio-economic rights under the African Charter Act. It would be interesting to see what the Nigerian courts would have to say about whether the Nigerian government is, within the available resources and through appropriate well directed and reasonably implemented policies, positively fulfilling its obligation to implement domestically socio-economic rights under the African Charter. However, it is interesting to note that, in the decision of the African Commission in the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) / Nigeria (SERAC and CESR / Nigeria), 78 the Commission found, among other things, that the Nigerian government was in breach of article 16 of the charter, by permitting multinational oil companies to engage in mining activities which caused serious environmental degradation and consequently affected the health of the people of Ogoniland. 79 The decision of the Commission though not binding on the Nigerian courts would have strong persuasive authority as to the proper interpretation of the provisions of the charter. 80 As regards solidarity rights, the Nigerian government was also indicted recently in the decision of the African Commission in SERAC and infringement of the applicant's constitutionally guaranteed right to life and dignity of human person, including the ''right to clean, poison-free, pollution-free and healthy environment. '' 84 In this case, the court based its decision on the constitutional basis of rights to life and human dignity, as well as the provisions of the African Charter including the solidarity right to a clean environment under article 24. The court held that the provisions of legislation that permitted continued gas flaring were ''inconsistent with the applicant's rights to life and/or dignity of human person enshrined in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act … and are therefore unconstitutional, null and void…'' 85 It should be noted that, at the time of writing, there is an appeal pending before the Court of Appeal challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. 86 It is hoped that the Nigerian appellate courts in the near future will have an opportunity to make a categorical and clear-cut decision on the enforcement not only of solidarity rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights in Nigeria, especially those contained in the African Charter Act. However, it is pertinent to point out that in the Gbemre case, the Federal High Court made an order requiring the first respondent, Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, and its joint venture partner the second respondent, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), to take immediate steps to stop the gas flaring. 87 It also made an order against the third respondent, the Attorney-General of the Federation, to set in motion the process, after consultation with the Federal Executive Council, to introduce a bill to the National Assembly to amend the existing law and make continuous gas flaring a crime. 88 This appears to suggest that the Nigerian courts, in enforcing solidarity rights, would be interested in looking at the policy and legislative actions of the government in order to determine whether reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that socioeconomic, cultural and solidarity rights are guaranteed.
Rights of the Child Act 89
The Rights of the Child Act was enacted on 16 July 2003 by the federal legislative organ of Nigeria, the National Assembly, after many years of opposition from certain quarters, who feared that such an act would introduce values totally foreign to the diverse societies in Nigeria. 90 Unlike the African Charter Act, this act does not have the relevant conventions contained in the schedule(s), neither does it explicitly indicate on its face that it is a domestication of the relevant human rights treaties which relate to the rights of the child, namely the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Union equivalent, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 91 actions that shall ensure the observance and popularization of the rights and welfare of a child as provided for'' in the CRC, the ACRWC and such other international conventions, charters and declarations relating to children to which Nigeria is or becomes a signatory. 110 The latter appears to suggest that treaties relating to the child will be observed by these committees, even if Nigeria has only signed but not ratified them. Perhaps this could be said to be in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which imposes an obligation upon a state that has signed a treaty to refrain from acts which would defeat the intention and purpose of the treaty until it has made clear its intention not to become a party. 111 The act clearly attempts to apply relevant provisions of international treaties on the basis of a Nigerian/African value system, emphasizing for example respect for one's elders and a more communal rather than individualistic approach to societal living. 112 The act, just like the ACRWC, while recognizing that duties are imposed on parents or other persons having parental responsibility (who have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child), also recognizes that the child has certain responsibilities. 113 The act points out that the child has responsibilities towards his family, society, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and other legally recognized communities, nationally and internationally. These responsibilities require that the child (subject to his / her age, ability and other specified limitations contained in the act or any other law) should: work towards the cohesion of his / her family and community; have respect for his / her parents, superiors and elders at all times and assist them in case of need; serve the nation by placing his / her physical and intellectual abilities at its service; contribute to the moral well-being of society; preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity; preserve and strengthen the independence and integrity of the nation; respect the ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, humaneness, honesty and justice for all persons; relate with other members of society who have different cultural values in a spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation; contribute to the best of his / her abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of Nigerian, African and world unity; and contribute to the best of his / her abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the solidarity of the African people and the human race. 114 The intended legal significance of these provisions is not clear, as it is difficult to see how these responsibilities would be legally enforceable.
The National Assembly has recently (even after the enactment of the Rights of the Child Act) been encouraging the various Houses of Assembly of the states to enact equivalent state laws purportedly for the effective implementation of the rights of the child in all parts of Nigeria. It is claimed that the reason for this is because legislating for the child, under the constitution, generally falls within the legislative competence of the Houses of Assembly of the States. 115 There has been growing opposition to this from certain Houses of Assembly of the States, especially in the north of the country, which has a large Moslem population, who are of the view that the whole gamut of the Rights of the Child Act runs contrary to their beliefs and cultural values. 116 While the support of the various states is no doubt required for the effective implementation of the rights of the child, it is doubtful if at this stage there is a need for specific legislation by the Houses of Assembly on this. Ordinarily, matters relating to children fall under the Residual Legislative List of the 1999 constitution which is within the sole legislative competence of the states. 117 However, there appears to be an exception to this under section 12(2) since the National Assembly, in the case of domestication of treaties, has the power to enact laws in respect of matters also under the Residual Legislative List. 118 thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative List for the purpose of implementing a treaty''. The Rights of the Child Act is purportedly the domestication of the relevant treaties ratified by Nigeria; therefore the National Assembly is empowered under section 12(2) of the constitution to make laws, not only for the federation, but also for ''any part thereof''. The input of the States Houses of Assembly in such a situation is enunciated in section 12(3) which states that ''A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall not be presented to the president for assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a majority of all the Houses of Assembly in the Federation''. Therefore a bill of the National Assembly to implement a treaty in respect of matters falling within the Residual Legislative List of the constitution (including matters relating to children) would be enacted for the federation or ''any part thereof'' if it has been ratified by a majority of all the Houses of Assembly of the federation and thereafter presented to the president for assent. Such an act would be enforceable as a valid law even in the territory of a dissenting state. 119 Moreover, under section 4(5) of the constitution, an act domesticating a treaty would prevail over any inconsistent law enacted by the House of Assembly, which would be void to the extent of the inconsistency. 120 It is presumed that the majority of the Houses of Assembly had ratified the Rights of the Child Bill before the president assented to it. 121 Therefore, by virtue of section 12(2) of the constitution, the act is applicable and enforceable in all parts of Nigeria. It is suggested that the issue now should not be one of enacting similar legislation at state level, but rather the enforcement of the act as a law validly made by the federal legislative organ under section 12 of the constitution, which ought to be implemented in all parts of Nigeria without the need for further state legislation. It is further suggested that the focal point for effective implementation of the act should now be large-scale education and counselling of people, especially in areas where there is significant opposition to the implementation of rights set out in the Rights of the Child Act and its correlation with cultural norms. 122 119 In the previous 1960 and 1963 Nigerian constitutions, a treaty on any matter within the legislative competence of the regions that was promulgated into law by the federal legislature did not apply to such regions without the consent of the governor of the region. It was therefore possible at that time for the application of such domesticated treaties to be excluded from a particular region by the governor's refusal to consent to its application. See note 11 above. 120 See note 54 above. 121 It is presumed that this statute is constitutional. In the US case of Ogden v Saunders 12
Wheat. (25 US) 213 at 270, a Supreme Court judge, Mr Justice Bushrod Washington, said, ''It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity and patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt''. 122 Fortunately steps in this regard are already being taken by the federal government and relevant organizations, including non-governmental organizations. See Muraina ''The child's rights within cultural norms'' at note 116 above.
THE POSITION OF NON-DOMESTICATED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN NIGERIA
Under section 12(1) of the constitution, human rights treaties signed and ratified by Nigeria (no matter how beneficial to the citizens) are not enforceable within Nigeria if they are not domesticated. 123 This appears to defeat the purpose of the numerous human rights treaties entered into by Nigeria, which are meant for the benefit of individuals within the territory of Nigeria. In reality, although the relevant rights provided in these nondomesticated treaties are discernable from the fundamental human rights provisions of the constitution, the domestication of these treaties would have the effect of strengthening the local application of the pertinent rights. Examples of human rights treaties (to which Nigeria is party) that are not domesticated include the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 124 132 Interestingly, Nigeria is not yet a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, despite the growing notoriety of the crime of genocide in view of its incidence in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 133 It is not clear why Nigeria is still not a party to this important human rights treaty, but perhaps this could simply be attributed to bureaucratic inertia.
In terms of regional human rights treaties, although Nigeria has ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, it is yet to domesticate these protocols. 134 On the other hand, it has not yet ratified the African Youth Charter and the more recent African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (although at the time of writing no African state has ratified either of these charters). 135 There have been calls on several occasions for the government to take steps to domesticate those human rights treaties which Nigeria has ratified. 136 For example, a non-governmental agency, Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF) has been at the forefront of the call for Nigeria to domesticate the CEDAW, which Nigeria has ratified, in order to strengthen the domestic protection of women against discrimination, an issue that, in many ways, is rampant in various societies in Nigeria. 137 The failure to domesticate certain human rights treaties that Nigeria has ratified is, to an extent, attributable to opposition in certain parts of the country to such implementation, on the grounds that the human rights treaties contain provisions which are contrary to local beliefs and cultural values. 
Indirect ways of applying non-domesticated human rights treaties

Using non-domesticated human rights treaties to aid interpretation
Despite the strict provisions of section 12(1) of the constitution, the courts are able to apply non-domesticated human rights treaties indirectly, by relying on them to assist in interpreting similar provisions in the constitution and other municipal legislation. One of the justices of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the Abacha case, though constrained by the provisions of section 12(1) of the constitution, recognized the importance of international human rights instruments in interpreting local laws. The learned justice of the Supreme Court, Ejiwunmi JSC, while acknowledging that a treaty not incorporated into law cannot be enforced, said, ''However, it is also pertinent to observe that the provisions of an uncorporated (sic) treaty might have indirect effect upon the construction of statutes or might give rise to a legitimate expectation by citizens that the government, in its acts affecting them, would observe the terms of the treaty''. 139 Although the learned justice of the Supreme Court did not cite any case in support of this contention, he appears to have been influenced by cases such as the Botswana case of Unity Dow v Attorney General of Botswana. 140 This case was cited with approval by another justice, Uwaifo JSC, who, in a rather impassioned statement, suggested an activist and pragmatic approach by the courts in the defence of the liberty and justice of individuals from abuse by the state. 141 In this case, Aguda JA, incidentally a Nigerian then serving in the Botswana Court of Appeal, said:
''I take the view that in all these circumstances a court in this country, faced with the difficulty of interpretation as to whether or not some legislation The learned justices of the Supreme Court, Ejiwunmi and Uwaifo JJSC, however, stopped short of referring to specific unincorporated human rights treaties, which they regarded as relevant in interpreting the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act. The justices had the opportunity to refer to similar provisions in other international human rights treaties ratified by Nigeria, such as the ICCPR, as a guide to the interpretation of the African Charter Act and the various federal military government legislation referred to by the government's lawyers in this case. 143 This practice has been adopted by other common law jurisdiction with a similar dualist system to that of Nigeria. 144 Perhaps the case of Abacha v Fawehinmi would have been an apt opportunity for the Supreme Court, as the highest court in Nigeria, to have made a clear and specific statement in support of the use of international human rights standards, as reflected in treaties ratified by Nigeria, as an aid to interpret the constitution and provisions of other municipal laws. 145 There are examples of Nigerian judges who have referred to nondomesticated treaties ratified by Nigeria to assist in interpreting relevant Nigerian laws, although these appear to be few and far between. An example of this is the Court of Appeal case of Mojekwu v Ejikeme, 146 where the Nrachi Nwanyi 147 custom of a group located in the east of the country (which had the effect of extinguishing a deceased person's lineage even though he had a female descendant) was struck out as being repugnant. One of the judges, Justice Niki Tobi who has since been elevated to the Supreme Court, made reference to the CEDAW in arriving at his decision that the Nrachi Nwanyi custom was repugnant and ought to be struck out.
Non-domesticated human rights treaties as customary international law
Another way that human rights treaties can apply in Nigeria without the need to be enacted as domestic legislation is if the provisions of the treaty have crystallized into rules of customary international law. In Nigeria, like most other common law countries, customary international law applies automatically without the need for it to be enacted in domestic legislation. 148 143 See arts 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the ICCPR. See In Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and Netherlands (the North Sea Continental Shelf cases), 149 which is authority for the fact that customary international law can arise from treaty provisions, the ICJ said, ''With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected''. 150 A perusal of various human rights treaties indicates that most of them have been adopted widely by most states in the world. 151 Arguably, it could be said that a significant part of the provisions of these treaties have the character of customary international law. Such human rights treaty provisions, which have crystallized into customary international law, escape the ambit of section 12(1) of the 1999 constitution and have automatic domestic application without the need for specific domestic legislation.
The possibility of the provisions of non-domesticated human rights treaties having crystallized into customary international norms (and therefore automatically being applicable in Nigeria) was not considered by the Supreme Court in the Abacha case. However the position of the court, especially the majority liberal constructionists' decision which seemed to be inclined to activist and pragmatic methods of protecting individuals' human rights, suggests that the courts would be willing to adopt this means, if necessary, to protect human rights. 152 This is more so if domestic legislation does not explicitly exclude the application of such customary international human rights norms. It is, therefore, expected that the Nigerian courts would be favourably disposed to applying, in relevant cases, provisions of non-domesticated human rights treaties as customary international law, when dealing with cases of human rights abuses. 153 There is no doubt that the Nigerian courts need to be more imaginative as to ways to apply international human rights treaties (especially those to which Nigeria is a party) even if they have not been enacted as a law of the National Assembly under section 12(1) of the constitution. The Nigerian courts, in the exercise of their powers to determine ''any question as to the civil rights and obligations'' 154 of any person, certainly need to ''draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples' rights'', 155 especially those rights contained in treaties (incorporated and unincorporated) to which Nigeria is a party.
THE NEED TO AMEND SECTION 12 OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION
A careful perusal of the human rights treaties which Nigeria has ratified reveals that, unlike certain other states, it has not entered any reservation to exclude or modify the legal effect of the treaties. 156 It, therefore, seems anomalous that non-domesticated human rights treaties ratified by Nigeria cannot directly be enforced before the municipal courts as a result of section 12(1) of the constitution. This is more so when one of the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria is the ''respect for international law and treaty obligations… '' 157 Under the 1999 constitution, Nigeria follows a presidential system of government based on the constitution of the United States of America. Under the US constitution, ratified treaties are regarded as part of the law of the land, since article VI, clause 2 states: ''This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding''. 158 Although the US provision is a step in the right direction towards making ratified treaties automatically part of domestic laws, it might not be the best approach for Nigeria since there are difficulties in interpreting article 153 VI, clause 2. The US courts have, over the years, distinguished between selfexecuting treaties (having automatic domestic application) and non selfexecuting treaties (requiring implementing domestic legislation), 159 a distinction which Paust argues is a judicial invention and rather subjective in its application. 160 As a result of the lack of clear-cut and objective rules, the US courts have, on certain occasions, found human rights treaties to be self-executing 161 and on other occasions not to be self-executing. 162 This, in itself, creates a problem with regard to the direct domestic application of certain ratified human rights treaties. It is suggested that the monistic model applied by most continental European countries may be a preferable option for the Nigerian constitution, rather than the full dualist model of most common law states or the partial dualist model of the USA. 163 Certain African States have adopted in their constitutions the automatic domestic application of treaties. An interesting model, which could serve as a guide to this suggested amendment of section 12(1) of the Nigerian constitution, is the 1992 constitution of Cape Verde, which makes it clear that a treaty that has been validly ratified by Cape Verde has, upon publication, force of law domestically. Article 11(2) and (4) of this constitution says:
''International Treaties and Agreements validly approved and ratified shall be in force in the Cape Verdian judicial system after the official publication as long as they are in force in the international legal system. Rules, principles of international Law, validly approved and ratified internationally and internally, and in force, shall take precedence over all laws and regulations below the Constitutional level' '. 164 This model, while preserving constitutional supremacy, allows for the automatic application and supremacy of ratified and officially published treaties, including human rights treaties, over non-constitutional laws.
Another African state, Ghana, on the other hand, while adopting under its constitution the dualist position inherited from Britain, makes special provision for the automatic application of human rights treaties. Section 33(5) of the 1992 Ghanaian constitution provides in its fundamental human rights chapter that, ''The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this chapter shall not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned which are considered to be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man''. This omnibus provision has been interpreted by the Ghanaian Supreme Court, in the case of National Patriotic Party v Attorney-General, as permitting international human rights instruments to be enforced in Ghana without the need for domesticating legislation. 165 In this writer's view, there is no reason why Nigeria should not discard the strictly dualist model under section 12(1) of the constitution, a relic inherited from its colonial past. The application of the dualist model in the United Kingdom is because treaty-making is a prerogative of the Crown and does not require the approval of the legislature. Therefore, the automatic domestic application of treaties would be a denial of parliamentary supremacy. 166 In Nigeria, there is no concept of parliamentary supremacy since it operates a US style constitutional system, where the constitution is supreme. However, Nigeria, just like the United Kingdom, vests in the federal executive the prerogative of treaty-making, without the input of the legislature that has the constitutional responsibility to make domestic laws. It is suggested that the constitution should be amended to allow for a role for the legislature prior to the ratification of a treaty. Like, for instance, the US and Ghanaian Constitutions, the Nigerian constitution could require that no treaty be ratified, unless it is approved by a specified majority in Nigeria's federal legislature, preferably the Senate. 167 Such a role for the federal legislature in the ratification of treaties would meet possible objections, based on the well-worn arguments that it would amount to lawmaking by the executive if treaties had automatic application in Nigeria.
Perhaps, if the Nigerian constitution does not totally discard the dualist model as a result of the desire to retain its historical common law heritage of domestic implementation of treaties, a less radical option may be to amend section 12(1) with a view to adopting a similar position to that for Ghana, by including provisions that permit the automatic application of human rights treaties ratified by Nigeria, without the need for domesticating legislation.
IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN NIGERIA AND BELIEFS / CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A significant consideration in the domestic implementation of human rights treaties in Nigeria is the impact of certain beliefs and cultural values. Whilst there must be a minimum core standard for the protection of human rights, the reality on the ground does point to the significance of beliefs and cultural values in the domestic implementation of human rights standards. Various African human rights instruments acknowledge the input of certain beliefs and cultural values in human rights implementation. For instance, in its preamble, the African Charter (which purports to be an attempt to package human rights against the background of African values) 168 states that it takes into consideration ''the virtues of [African] historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize [African] reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights.'' The ACRWC, also in its preamble, points out that it takes into consideration ''the virtues of [African] cultural heritage, historical background and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize [African] reflection on the concept of the rights and welfare of the child.'' It however warns that any ''custom, tradition, cultural or religious practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations contained in the present Charter shall to the extent of such inconsistence be discouraged.'' 169 Even the CRC acknowledges the significance of local customs in the implementation of the convention. 170 However, there is always a need to balance the beliefs and cultural values of a people group and the need to guard against human rights abuses under the cover of beliefs and cultural values. In the domestic implementation of human rights in Nigeria, there is a constant need for such a balance, as there have been examples of resistance to implementation of human rights in certain quarters as a result of the perception that it is contrary to local beliefs and cultural values. For instance, for a long while there was resistance to the Rights of the Child Act. There was concern in certain parts of Nigeria, especially in the north, about setting the age of a child as being under 18 years in view of local practice of giving away girls in marriage at younger ages. 171 In spite of this, the Rights of the Child Act, in line with the relevant treaties, retains the relevant age as being under 18 years. 172 The act proceeds further to declare that a person under the age of 18 years is incapable of contracting a valid marriage and any such purported marriage would be null, void and of no effect. It additionally creates offences under which parents and guardians who give a child in betrothal or marriage (as well as any other person to whom a child is given in betrothal or marriage) would be guilty. 173 The position of the act is perhaps not surprising in view of the prevalent health problem in Nigeria, especially in the north, of vesico vaginal fistula (VVF) caused as a result of giving adolescent females away in marriage. 174 Further, the interpretation of certain human rights treaty provisions in Nigeria may vary from the interpretation given by other jurisdictions, especially more developed ones, as a result of the beliefs and cultural values of most Nigerian people. For instance, what would amount to an inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of a child would have to be understood in the Nigerian context. 175 Whilst totally abhorring the physical abuse of a child under the guise of corporal punishment, generally the beliefs and cultural values of the diverse societies in Nigeria endorse corporal punishment of a child as long as it is ''reasonable chastisement''. 176 The view is that corporal punishment instils discipline and causes a child to grow up to become a responsible member of society. Therefore, for example, corporal punishment is still applied in Nigerian schools 171 despite a ministerial note that has been sent to schools to notify them that corporal punishment has been prohibited. 177 In addition, although the provisions of CEDAW, a treaty ratified by Nigeria without any reservation, prohibit discrimination against women, there are certain discriminatory practices directed against women and female children that are encouraged by beliefs and culture. In the area of inheritance, for instance, there are certain customs that encourage discrimination against women and female children. Examples abound in certain parts of Nigeria of customary laws that prevent both a widow and her daughters from inheriting property where there is no male child. Fortunately, the courts have, in certain cases, struck down some of these customs as being discriminatory and therefore repugnant. 178 In the case of Mojekwu v Mojekwu, 179 for instance, the Court of Appeal struck down an Ibo custom that denied the widow the right to inherit the property of her deceased husband. However, there have also been unfortunate cases, such as the Supreme Court case of Akinnubi v Akinnubi, 180 where the court actually upheld a Yoruba custom that regarded a widow, whose husband died intestate, as part of the deceased's estate to be administered or inherited by the deceased's family. 181 Also, the recent cases from certain northern states, in which three women, Safiyyatu Hussein, Amina Lawal and Bariya Ibrahima Magazu, were convicted for offences involving extra marital sexual relations contrary to Sharia criminal laws while the men involved were not even prosecuted, provide further indication of ingrained discrimination against women based on beliefs and culture. 182 
CONCLUSION
Under section 12 of the Nigerian constitution, treaties ratified by Nigeria must be enacted as domestic legislation for them to be enforceable. While a few human rights treaties have been domesticated under this dualist system, a number of ratified treaties are yet to be domesticated. The utility of this dualist position of the Nigeria constitution is doubtful. This section of the constitution appears to be merely a relic of Nigeria's colonial past and there is no justifiable reason why treaties ratified by Nigeria should not have automatic domestic application. Such automatic domestic application of ratified human rights treaties, as is done in certain other jurisdictions, in the view of this writer, would go a long way in bringing human rights home to the ultimate beneficiaries of these treaties: individuals within Nigeria's borders. The amendment of section 12, a constitutional provision, as suggested in this article, would however involve a tedious and complicated process. 183 Therefore, pending any such amendment, it is suggested that Nigeria's courts should be more proactive in applying non-domesticated treaties indirectly, either as an aid to interpret other domestic legislation or as customary international law norms.
The African Charter, a human rights treaty which has been domesticated in Nigeria, includes social, economic and cultural as well as solidarity rights and therefore raises crucial questions as to the domestic implementation of these rights. So far there has been no decision of the Nigerian appellate courts that provides a clear guide as to how socio-economic and cultural, as well as solidarity rights, under the charter should be interpreted and enforced. However, guidance can be obtained from decisions of the South African courts, which have had the benefit of interpreting and enforcing similar provisions in the South African constitution, and also decisions of the African Commission. All in all, the implementation of these nontraditional human rights is capital intensive, so their effective implementation ultimately depends on the political will of the government (executive and legislative) to take all appropriate steps, including the adoption of legislative measures, to implement such rights. 184 Undoubtedly, beliefs and cultural values play a significant role in the effective domestic implementation of human rights treaties in Nigeria. Whilst beliefs and cultural values cannot be disregarded, it is crucial that the government and the courts play a more proactive role in ensuring that such beliefs and cultural values are not used as a cover to justify blatant human rights abuses. The government must take positive steps to legislate against and educate, as well as counsel, the citizens, in respect of beliefs and cultural values that are inconsistent with the effective implementation of ratified human rights treaties. The courts, on the other hand, should be more active in striking out any repugnant belief or culture that is inconsistent with ratified human rights treaties.
183 Sec 9(2) of the constitution indicates that the provisions of sec 12(1) cannot be altered by either house of the National Assembly unless the proposal ''is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all the members of that House and approved by resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the States''. 184 Art 2(1) of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
